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Abstract
Today, as business processes are getting more complex and the volumes of stored data about
business process executions are increasing in size, collecting information for the analysis and
for  the  improvement  of  the  business  process  security1,  is  becoming  a  complex  task.
Information systems that support business processes record business process executions into
event logs which capture the behavior of system usage in terms of events. Business process
event  logs  can  be  used  for  analysing  and  improving  the  business  process,  but  also  for
analysing the information security. One of the main goals of security analysis is to check the
compliance with existing security requirements. Also event logs can be the basis for business
process mining, or shortly process mining. Utilizing bottom-up process mining on event logs,
we can extract business process-related information for security analysis. Process mining is
not just only for discovering business process models, but also other models, such as security
models.  For  this  purpose,  we  present  a  possible  approach  to  extract  RBAC  models
(semi-)automatically from event logs in XES format. The focus is also on determining the
protected  business  assets,  such as  document  or  other  artifact  data  that  is  exchanged and
accessed during business process activities. In addition, we evaluate the applicability of this
approach with conformance checking where we check the compliance of a real-life event log
with respect to the LTL constraints translated from RBAC model. Eventually, the purpose of
the extracted RBAC models is that they provide a basis for security analysis and they can be
adapted by other applications in order to implement access control mechanism.
Keywords: 
business process mining, Process-Aware Information System, event log, Role-Based Access
Control model
1 In the context of this work, the security of the information accessed and exchanged during business process 
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Rollipõhise juurdepääse kontrolli mudeli tuletamine  
äriprotsessi sündmuste logide põhjal
Lühikokkuvõte
Keeruliste  äriprotsesside  ja  järjest  suurenevate  andmemahtude  juures  on  väljakutsuvaks
ülesandeks analüüsida ja parandada ettevõtte  äriprotsessi  andmeturvalisust.  Infosüsteemid,
mis toetavad äriprotsessi mudeli (abstraktne esitus äriprotsessist) rakendamist, registreerivad
äriprotsessi  tegevusi  sündmustena  eraldi  logisse.  Salvestatud  sündmuste  logid  on  aluseks
äriprotsessiga  seotud  andmete  kaevamiseks.  Need  andmed  on  vajalikud  äriprotsessi
analüüsimiseks  ja  parendamiseks,  kuid  neid  andmeid  võib  kasutada  ka  turvaanalüüsiks.
Turvaanalüüsi üheks eesmärgiks on ka  kontrollida, kas nende andmete hulgas turvalisusega
seotud informatsioon on kooskõlas praeguste turvanõuetega. Lisaks, äriprotsessi logide peal
saab  rakendada  äriprotsessikaeve  (uurimisvaldkond,  mis  ühendab  andmekaeve  ja
äriprotsesside modelleerimise)  tehnikaid,  et  luua äriprotsessi  mudeleid.  Lisaks äriprotsessi
mudelitele on võimalik tuletada ka teisi mudeleid, näiteks turvamudeleid, mida saab hiljem
kasutada turvameetmete tagamiseks infosüsteemis. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on esitada üks
võimalik meetod, kuidas luua rollipõhist ligipääsukontrolli esitatavaid turvamudeleid (Role-
Based  Access  Control  models)  XES-formaadis   sündmuste  logidest,  mis  on  salvestatud
äriprotsessi  toetava infosüsteemi poolt. Lisatähelepanu on suunatud kaitstavate  infovarade
väljaselgitamiseks  sündmuste  logide  põhjal.  Need  infovarad  on   näiteks  dokumendid,
dokumendiväljad, või muud andmed, mida töödeldakse äriprotsessi tegevuste jooksul. Lisaks,
me  hindame  antud  meetodi  rakendatavust  reaalse  äriprotsessi  sündmuste  logi  peal.  Ühe
võimaliku meetodina me kontrollime sündmuste logi andmete ja seoste vastavust juurdepääsu
õigustega olemasoleva rollipõhise juurdepääsu kontrolli turvamudelis. Lõppkokkuvõttes võib
sündmuste  logidest  tuletatud  rollipõhist  ligipääsu  kontrolli  mudelit  võtta  aluseks
turvaanalüüsiks või rakendada mõnes süsteemis juurdepääsumehhanismina.
Võtmesõnad:
äriprotsessikaeve, äriprotsessilogid, infosüsteemid, rollipõhise ligipääsu kontrolli mudel
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1 Introduction
Today, more and more organizations are becoming dependent on information technology to
facilitate their business operations, thereby meeting their business objectives. Keeping track
of the performance of business activities in an organization has become important for process
analysis, which is essential for the organization to stay competitive and progress in time.
Most of the business process improvement decisions are driven by the knowledge stored by
information system. Therefore,  organizations are concerned with the security (in terms of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the business assets, which include information,
business process itself, and other confidential data.
A possible solution to protect business assets is to establish access control mechanism, such
as role-based access control (RBAC)[1]. RBAC introduces the concept of role, which is the
classification of users based on their qualifications, responsibilities, or authorities within an
organization. Users acquire the access (the “need”) to system resources (the “know”) through
being a member of a role.  Resent years show that RBAC has been adopted for different
systems  as  the  primary  access  control  mechanism  [2],  including  business  process
management systems. This is mainly due to the fact that RBAC reduces the complexity and
simplifies the administration of access control. 
Business process management systems, or in general process-aware systems (PAIS)[3], are
driven  by  explicit  business  process  models.  PAIS-s  have  built-in  capabilities  to  record
business process executions as a stream of events (hence the name event log), where a single
event corresponds to a specified step in business process. Usually,  business processes are
complex  and  event  logs  contain  large  volumes  of  data.  To  overcome  these  obstacles,  a
bottom-up process mining is used for getting insights about business processes from event
logs. Process mining can be interpreted as an intersection between data mining and business
process modeling. Event logs are not just the source for discovering business process models,
but also the source for security analysis and checking the compliance with existing security
requirements [4]. Additionally, utilizing the potential of process mining, we can derive other
models,  such  as  organizational  models  [5] or  RBAC  models  [6].  In  this  work,  we  are
particularly interested in standard RBAC models[1]. These RBAC models serve as a basis for
security analysis and can be adapted by different applications in order to implement access
control mechanism.
The aim of this work is to present an approach how to extract RBAC models from event logs.
The  main  focus  is  on  extracting  information  about  business  assets  (such  as  different
documents and document fields) that needs to be protected. This work can be considered as a
complementary solution to existing approaches, which are discussed in section 3.2.
This thesis work tries to address the following research questions:
1. What data could be extracted from a business process event log and how this data
could be used for creating RBAC models?
Answering to  the first  question we specify what  kind of information is  even possible  to
extract from event logs and present an approach to get RBAC models from extracted business
process data. In this thesis, the approach is divided into three steps. In the first step, we make
use of process mining technique to discover business process data from an event log. In the
second step, we create in-memory object of RBAC model via applying transofrmation rules
on extracted business process data. In the last step, we export RBAC model in XML-based
format which structure is presented using XML Schema Definition specifically composed for
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this work.
2. How applicable is this approach on real-life business process event logs?
We evaluate  the  approach through conformance checking.  First,  we compare  two RBAC
models created from different event logs produced by the same source information system.
Secondly, we test the compliance between RBAC models and an event log. For the second
conformance checking, we utilize the approach presented in [7], which makes use of Linear
Temporal Logic constraints as RBAC constraints.
This  work  is  divided  into  eight  chapters.  In  chapter  2,  we  give  theoretical  overview of
technologies and terminology used in this work. In chapter 3, we give the review of the state
of the art and contribution of this work given the state of the art. In chapter 4 and chapter 5
we describe  the  approach  in  step-wise  manner  and  illustrate  this  approach  with  running
example. In chapter 6, we compare two RBAC models created from different event created
from the same information system. We check the RBAC model, specifically role-permission
relationships, compliance with an event log. In chapter 7, we summarize research and discuss
some future work. 
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2 Background and Technology
The purpose of this chapter is to give relevant background for this thesis topic. First,  we
present the main concepts of process mining. Then we discuss business process event logs. In
particular, we introduce the basic elements and structure of typical event log, the primary
format for event log (eXtensible Event Stream (XES)) and the requirements that event log
needs to satisfy in order to be used in this thesis work. We introduce Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) and the core RBAC model, which is used as the reference RBAC model in
the remainder of this thesis. We determine the terminology for discussing RBAC concepts in
this work. Then, we discuss how RBAC concepts are expressed through elements of event
log in XES format. Lastly,  we present a short overview of eXchanged Markup Language
(XML) technology. 
2.1 Concepts of Process Mining
In  this  section,  we  discuss  the  concepts  of  process  mining  [8].  In  most  cases  business
processes are modelled in top-down manner to describe the desirable version of business
process. Usually, these models are presented in some modeling language, such as BPMN[9],
YAWL[10], EPCs[11], Petri Nets[12]. These explicit graphical models are used to give the
better understanding of the business process. Furthermore, these models can be configured
into  information  systems,  such  as  Process-Aware  Information  System  (PAIS),  which  is
defined as “a software system that manages and executes operational processes involving
people, applications, and/or information sources on the basis of process models”[3]. PAIS
records  process  execution  data  in  process  execution  logs  (denoted  as  event  logs).  PAIS
instantiates model multiple times, each instantiation stores new process instance (or case) into
the  log.  The  motivation  of  process  mining  is  that  business  processes  are  getting  more
complex, increasing in size of activities, work-flow decisions, and participants. Therefore,
these models cannot be created by hand and there has to be a mature way how to get different
aspects of business process from business process execution logs. 
Business process mining, or simply process mining, is a research discipline that develops and
provides means, such as techniques, tools (e.g., ProM[13]), algorithms (e.g., process control-
flow discovery  α-algorithm developed in  [14]), to discover, monitor, and improve real-life
business processes. There exists three types of process mining: discovery, conformance, and
enhancement of business processes. 
The discovery technique takes on event log and extracts information about business process
from event log without having any prior information. This discovery technique is not used
only for creating process models, but to also for deriving other models, such as organizational
models [5] or, as in the context of this work, RBAC models [6][15]. 
The second type  of  process  mining is  used  to  measure  the  alignment  between idealized
process model and the actual real-life process model as captured in an event log. In this work,
we  are  not  checking  conformance  between  business  process  model  and  event  log,  but
between RBAC model (specifically role-permission assignments) and event log. We utilize
the  approach  presented  in  [7] to  use  Linear  Temporal  Logic  constraints  generated  from
authorization constrains to conform event log. In [16] it is shown how to conform business
process model using LTL-based constraints.  Linear Temporal Logic,  as the name implies,
uses  temporal  operators  in  addition  to  classical  logical  operators,  such  as  always  (□),
eventually (◊), until (U), weak next (W), and next (○). A subset of these operations are used in
this work when creating LTL formulas from RBAC constraints in section 6.2.
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The third type of process mining is the enhancement of existing business process using the
data about real business process as recorded in an event log. Oftentimes, the actual process
deviates from the desired process. For this reason, the enhancement technique is to modify
the existing process model in order to better reflect the reality.
Process mining assumes that PAIS sequentially records business process activities as a stream
of  events  where  each  event  is  a  part  of  particular  process  instance.  PAIS  can  include
additional information with event, such as the performer or originator of the event (i.e., a
person or a system executing or initiating activity), the activity (i.e., a predefined step in the
process), the timestamp of the event, or the data elements of the event (e.g., cost, quantity
etc). Additionally, event can contain additional information about the lifecycle of an activity,
namely  event  type (the standard  event  life-cycle  model  in  [8] Fig.  4.3).  Event  types  can
indicate the start or the end of an activity, examples are  start,  schedule,  complete,  suspend.
The typical structure of event log is illustrated in Figure 16 (an example of such event log is
given in Table 11 as tabular data). Most of the graphical business process models depict the
control-flow (the ordering of activities) of business process, expressed in Petri Nets [12] or
other  notation,  however  process  mining can  be  applied  to  mine  different  perspectives  of
business  process  other  than  control-flow  [17].  In  [8],  there  are  discussed  four  main
perspectives that process mining is used for analysis of the business process: 
• the control-flow perspective: the ordering of activities and corresponding paths; 
• the  organizational  perspective:  people  and  systems  who  are  participating  in  the
process  and  how  they  are  related;  one  goal  is  to  determine  the  structure  of  an
organization by classifying people in terms of roles;
• the case perspective: describes the properties of a case (process instance), for example
tasks  and originators  working on them,  or  values  of  corresponding data  elements
during one process instance;
• the time perspective: the timing and frequency of events.
In  this  work,  we  use  process  discovery  technique  to  get  information  about  activities,
performers,  and  data  elements.  Specifically,  we  are  interested  in  the  organizational
perspective, i.e., how people or systems are classified into roles, and the case perspective, i.e.,
who are the people or systems involved with different activities and which data elements they
manipulate.  We pay less  attention  to  time perspective (when) and work-flow perspective
(how).
2.2 Event Logs
In this chapter, we present the general structure of business process execution logs (denoted
as event logs) and describe one specific format of event log that is being used in this work.
Most of the concepts about event logs are adapted from [8].
2.2.1 Basic Structure and Elements
Business process executions are recorded in PAIS as a stream of events where each event is a
part  of one process instance (denoted as case).  For process mining, a list  of information
pieces needs to be present in event log in order to mine business process (as listed also in
[8]):
• business process cases;
• events where each event corresponds to exactly one case;
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• events in case are ordered;
• events can have attributes, such as the activity name (i.e., a well-defined step in the
process), the performer, the timestamp, and additional data elements.
The structure of event log (how these pieces of information are interrelated), is illustrated in
Figure 16. Oftentimes, business process activity which represents a single unit of work is
called  task,  or  in  other  words  atomic  activity.  In  this  thesis  work,  regardless  of  this
distinction, we use the term activity. Additionally, event can contain additional information
about the event type (i.e., lifecycle transition).
2.2.2 eXtensible Event Stream (XES)
The problem with event logs is that they are vendor-dependent, i.e., different vendors and
information systems define their own format for event logs. For this reason, IEEE Task Force
on  Process  Mining[18] suggests  to  use a  standardized  generally-acknowledged  logging
format, called XES (eXtensible Event Stream). XES is supported by different process mining
tools,  such as ProM[13],  OpenXES[19],  Nitro[20].  In  here,  we elaborate  on some of the
syntax presented by XES standard, the full description is given in [21].
An  XML-based  XES  document  (see  Figure  18)  contains  log element  consisting  of  any
number of trace elements (i.e., cases). Each trace consists of event elements corresponding to
exactly  one  trace.  Each of  the  log,  trace,  and event  element  can  contain  any number  of
attributes with specific type. XES standard defines attribute types, such as String, Date, Int,
Float, and Boolean. In order to provide semantics to commonly used attributes (e.g. concept,
org, lifecycle, time etc.), XES standard introduces extensions. In XES format, some of these
extensions are: concept, organizational, time, and life-cycle, with prefixes, such as “concept”,
“org”, “time”,  and  “lifecycle”,  respectively. The  keys  of  all  attributes  defined  by  the
extension will be prepended by the extension prefix and separated by the colon [21], e.g., the
name of  an activity is  presented  using “concept:name” attribute  key and this  attribute  is
defined by  concept extension. XES distinguishes two lists of global attributes: one for the
traces and for one events. In this work, we are particularly interested in attributes that are
used within the scope of events.
A mandatory part of XES is also to provide event classifiers, which are defined through a set
of  attributes,  i.e.,  attributes  that  give an identity to  each event.  For  example,  event  with
Activity is  based on “concept:name” attribute,  event  with  Resource classifier  is  based  on
“org:resource” attribute. 
In this work, we use XES as the primary format of event logs. An example event log in XES
format is presented in Table 12. Mappings from business process data to XES elements are
presented  in  Table  1,  where  log element  represents  the  entire  business  process.  A  trace
element represents a particular process case, where element log contains a number of traces.
Business process activity is defined through attribute with key “concept:name”, the performer
of an activity is defined through attribute with key “org:resource”, the execution time of an
activity is defined through attribute with key “time:timestamp”, event type is defined through
attribute  with  key  “lifecycle:transition”,  and  additional  information  is  defined  through
attributes of types String,  Date,  Int,  Float, or Boolean. All of these elements with attributes
are nested in a single element event. A set of events is nested in one specific trace element.
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Table 1: Representation of event log elements in XES (adapted from [21])
Process log (as the top level element)
Case trace
Event event
Activity string element attribute with key 
concept:name on the event level
Resource (i.e., person or system) string element attribute with key 
org:resource on the event level
Time date element attribute with key 
time:timestamp on the event level
Event type string element attribute with key 
lifecycle:transition on the event 
level
Additional attributes XES format allows to present attributes in 
five different types: String, Date, Int, 
Float, Boolean, depending on the value 
data type it represents.
2.2.3 Requirements for Event Log
The applicability of the approach presented in this work depends on the completeness of an
event log in terms of business process elements. For this reason, events in event log in format
of XES needs to meet at least minimum set of requirements: 
• Activity:  event  refers  to  activity  using  attribute  with  key  “concept:name”.
Additionally, an entry in event log may include activity life-cycle information (also
referred to as event type), such as a start or a completion of an activity via attribute
with key “lifecycle:transition”.
• User: event refers to user using attribute with key “org:resource”.
• Role:  event  refers  to  role  using  attribute  with  key “org:role”  alongside  with  user
information. If this requirement is not met and only user informaton is provided, then
additional effort is spent on classifying users into roles. Most likely, due to the large
amount of users, classification is done automatically using role mining techniques (a
selection  of  them is  discussed  under  chapter  3).  Later  on,  domain  knowledge  is
required to interpret these classifications and to make necessary corrections, because
these classifications may not accurately reflect the roles in the real business process.
Moreover, these classifications can be different for different data sets originating from
the  same  source  information  system.  For  convenience,  we  assume  that  the  role
information is existent in event log.  This implies that roles are predetermined and
some primitive role management is implemented into PAIS beforehand. There is also
an option to define roles and assign them for each and every user manually.
• Data elements: event includes domain-specific data attributes, which are represented
in the log using XES data element type definitions (described in section 2.2.2). Data
attributes  and their  values  can  be  considered  as  valuable  business  assets,  such as
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resource  identifier,  invoice  number  and  so  on.  Thus,  data  attributes  needs  to  be
protected from unauthorized access within and also from outside of an organization.
If this information is available, we can discover business process element and relationships
from an event log as basis to get RBAC model.
2.3 Role-Based Access Control
In information systems security, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)[1] is a security model
where the access to system resources is regulated through permissions assigned to roles. A
motivation to use RBAC model is that system can have a lot of users. For this reason, instead
of making access control decisions on the level of individual users, access control decisions
are determined on the level of roles that individual users have as part of an organization. The
concept of role generally implies the qualifications, responsibilities, or authorities within an
organization. Roles tend to be more stable and not change as frequently, which simplifies the
management of permissions.
For  describing  the  basic  concepts  of  RBAC,  we  refer  to  the  reference  RBAC model[1]
proposed as NIST2 standard. In core RBAC, a user can have one to many roles, permissions
are given to the appropriate roles, and a user requests a permission by being member of a
role. Users and roles have many-to-many relationship, i.e., a user can have many roles and a
role can have many users. Similarly, there is many-to-many relationship between roles and
permissions, i.e., a role can have many permissions and a permission can be associated with
many roles. In current work, the core RBAC model (or in other words, a flat RBAC model) is
used,  therefore  other  extensions,  such  as  hierarchical  RBAC,  constrained  RBAC,  are
discarded.
The core RBAC model defines a minimum set of RBAC elements and relationships to define
a role-based access control system (as depicted on  Figure 1). There are five main RBAC
elements:  users,  roles,  objects,  operations,  and  permissions.  A  user (also  denoted  as  a
subject) is defined as a person or a system. A role is defined as a job or a function within an
organization. Role can refer to the authority and responsibilities that are delegated to the user
assigned to the role. A permission is an approval to perform an operation on one or more
protected objects. In most cases, “permissions are always positive and confer the ability to the
holder of the permission to perform some action(s) in the system”[22]. An  operation is an
executable  sequence  of  instructions  which  can  be  invoked  to  perform some  task  or  job
function for the user. The nature of the permission operations depend on the implementation
details and system type, but in general, operations include create, read, update, and delete (in
terms of CRUD implementation). An object (also denoted as a resource) is a document or a
piece of information on which operations are performed by users, therefore it needs to be
protected to prevent unauthorized access. The RBAC model embodies three relationships (as
can be seen on Figure 1): user-role relationship, role-permission relationship, and operation-
object (as permission) relationship. 
2 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): http://www.nist.gov/
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2.4 Terms used for describing RBAC concepts
In this section, we present the terminology used for discussing RBAC concepts during this
work. The RBAC model is semantically the same as presented in section  2.3, however we
have introduced some small changes to it, as illustrated in RBAC model as UML[23] diagram
(see Figure 2). 
In business process context,  users (denoted also as  subjects in  the following parts  of the
work)  are  referred  to  as  (human) resources  [8] or  originators,  i.e.,  a  person or  a  system
performing some activity. Although, in the context of this work,  resource as material or a
piece  of  information  is  used  for  denoting documents  or  other  artifacts  accessed  during
business  process  execution  (in  core  RBAC  definition  referred  to  as  objects).  These
documents may contain fields or data attributes (in our case  resource attributes) which are
manipulated  during  some  business  activity.  In  RBAC  context,  business  activity  is  an
operation on resource. 
In most cases, the event log does not include the information to identify resources in the form
of documents or artifacts, only the different data attributes as key-value pairs as a part of
some  document  or  artifact.  Therefore,  we  assume  that  semantically  the  composition  of
resource  attributes  is  a  resource  (as  also  depicted  in  Figure  2).  Hence,  protecting  each
resource attribute is protecting implicitly the whole resource.
2.5 RBAC Concepts Expressed through XES Elements
2.5.1 RBAC Operation
Every process instance contains a sequence of events. In the scope of a single event, business
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Figure 2: RBAC model as UML class diagram
Figure 1: Role-Based Access Control model (adapted from [1])
process activity is recorded using  string element with attribute value “concept:name”. This
activity is considered as an RBAC operation on protected resource. 
Event entry can contain also event type to specify business process activity, such as start or
completion  of  an  activity,  which  is  expressed  using  string element  with  attribute  value
“lifecycle:transition”. Thus, an activity in conjuction with a event type is an RBAC operation.
RBAC operations can be also of different types. For example, when defining RBAC model in
model-driven approach when using SecureUML[22], these types are referred to as action
types and each type “represents a class of security relevant operations on a particular type of
protected resource”. In RBAC definition, as discussed in section 2.3, we interpreted them as
CRUD operations, such as create, read, update, or delete operation. However, this kind of
information is not captured within event logs and it is difficult or even impossible to derive
this information from event logs. Therefore,  operation types are not handled explicitly in
current work.
2.5.2 RBAC Subject and Role
User and role information are expressed through “Organizational” extension of XES using
the extension prefix “org”[21], Hence, string elements are used which have key attributes
with values “org:resource” and “org:role” for denoting user and role, respectively.
2.5.3 RBAC Resource 
In current approach, data attribute keys and data attribute values which are extracted from an
event log are considered as RBAC resources. Event log can also include data attributes that
may not be relevant when creating RBAC model. It requires manual intervention for sorting
them out by domain expert. Additionally, some of the global attributes are used not only on
the level of event, but also on the level of entire process instance. For the simplicity, only data
attributes are considered that are associated with particular event (specifically, with particular
task). In terms of RBAC, data attributes are protected resources.
XES element (in the scope of event) RBAC element
string element  with  attribute  value
„concept:name“
Operation
string element  with  attribute  value
„lifecycle:transition“
Specification of an operation
string element  with  attribute  value
„org:resource“
User (or subject)
string element with attribute value „org:role“ Role
All the data attributes in the scope of event Resource attribute
2.6 Extensible Markup Language
Extensible Markup Language (XML)[24] is a markup language for documents to present its
contents in a structured way. XML allows to express semantics of the elements, which makes
the XML document both human-readable and machine-readable. XML is considered as one
of  the  main data  storage  and exchange formats,  because it  is  widely used as  a  base for
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integration and communication between different applications.
The validation of XML is done using schemas, such as XML Schema Definition (XSD)[25].
XSD formally describes the purpose of the XML document, specifically the structure and
constraints, which the XML document needs to conform in order to be valid.
In order to use the contents of XML document in an application, XML processors, or simply
XML parsers, take the XML document and specification (for example XSD) as input and read
in the information stored in XML document. If XSD or DTD (Document Type Definition) is
specified, XML processor will also give the validation. 
In this work, XML document is used for presenting the RBAC model, which can be adapted
by other applications.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the concepts and technologies used in this thesis. In particular,
we introduced the main concepts of process mining. We discussed the business process event
logs, especially the primary format for event log and the minimum requirements for event log
used in this work. We introduced the RBAC model definition which is the fundamental to the
remainder of this work. We discussed how the XES event log elements are interpreted as
RBAC model concepts. Lastly, we gave a short overview of XML technology. 
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3 Related Work
In this chapter, we give an overview of the state of the art. First, we discuss the approaches
regarding process mining, specifically role mining or organizational mining, which can be
used for extracting data for RBAC models. Then, we give an overview of existing approaches
related with extracting RBAC models from business process data stored in specification files
or business process event logs. Finally, we compare the related works against the current
solution and highlight the contributions of this work.
3.1 Organizational Mining
Our main interest in process mining is to extract business process related data from an event
log,  specifically different  business  process  elements  and their  relationships  which  can be
mapped to RBAC concepts. In process mining research field, a lot of effort has been devoted
to control-flow discovery. However, there exists many process mining algorithms that mine
different perspectives of business process [17] that could be potentially contribute to creating
RBAC models,  other  than  just  business  process  control-flow.  In  [17],  a  role  assignment
perspective is presented, which captures the relationships between roles and activities. These
relationships are discovered by algorithm that clusters subjects using similarity metric. Some
of  the  organizational  mining  techniques  are  presented  in  [5] which  can  be  used  for
discovering organizational perspective of business process, such as organizational structure
and  interactions  between  different  organizational  entities.  In  [5],  organizational  entity  is
defined as a set of originators (persons or machines executing business process activities)
who  represent  some organizational  unit,  role,  etc.  The  methods  that  are  included  in  the
mentioned  approach  [5] are  also  supported  by different  plug-ins  of  open-source  process
mining workbench ProM[13], such as Organizational Miner, Social network miner. However,
these process mining techniques do not focus on deriving RBAC model elements, therefore
they are not designed to extract RBAC data and create RBAC models from event logs.
In the field of role mining, there have been different methods proposed how to derive role
information from different system configuration sources. Kuhlmann et al. uses data mining
techniques  (e.g.,  association rule  algorithm, hierarchical  clustering)  to  find roles  from an
existing database of cross-platform access rights  [26]. Subsequently, RBAC model can be
created  based  on  these  detected  patterns.  Molloy et  al.  propose  an  approach  for  finding
RBAC model based on the observed usage of the permissions by system users  [27]. The
approach uses generative machine learning algorithms, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) and Author-Topic Model (ATM), which are enhanced with a discretization procedure
to convert the probabilistic assignments into actual binary permission to role and role to user
assignments.  Another approach proposed by Molloy et  al.  is  to mine roles with semantic
meanings  [28].  The authors  make use of  available  attributes attached with user  data  (for
example,  job  title,  department  name,  location)  and  possible  permission  information
(permission parameters,  permission updates,  permission usage) which help to create roles
with semantic meanings. The idea behind this approach is that  “a semantically meaningful
role should correspond to a real-world concept, and a real-world concept can be described by
an  expression  of  user-attributes”[28].  In  this  work,  we  apply  the  same  principle  on  the
protected  resources  and  their  attributes  within  event  log,  i.e.,  a  group  of  data  attributes
semantically form a resource.
These previous role mining techniques are not fully incorporated within this work. The main
reason is that the event log in format of XES can include role information, which is annotated
with “org:role” attribute key. Thus,  the “org:role” attribute can be used to mine roles for
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RBAC model.
3.2 Extracting RBAC Models from Business Process Data
Mengling et al. have proposed an approach [29] how to extract RBAC model from business
process  specification  presented  in  Business  Process  Execution  Language  (BPEL)[30].  In
particular,  they  present  mappings  from  BPEL to  RBAC  elements.  For  example,  BPEL
partner and  partnerRole represent  roles.  BPEL activities for incoming messages,  such as
pick, receive, and synchronous invoke, are considered as RBAC operations. BPEL port types
(as the interfaces to actual implementation of the system) are regarded as RBAC objects.
Therefore,  permissions  are  operation-object  pairs.  The  authors  also  provide  extraction
mechanism,  using  XSLT  transformation  script,  how  to  transform  XML-encoded  BPEL
process to RBAC model in XML format supported by access control policy management tool
called xoRBAC[31] (a component of role engineering tool called xoRET[32]). The presented
work is similar to this thesis contribution in a sense that these approaches are concerned with
access control for business processes, although sources, where RBAC data is extracted from,
are different.
Baumgrass presents an approach [6] of deriving current state RBAC models from event logs
which is the most similar work to this thesis. In several aspects, the approach is the same,
specifically when mapping event log elements in format of XES to RBAC model elements.
However,  there  are  still  some  conceptual  differences,  which  needs  to  be  highlighted.
Baumgrass  focuses  on  more  role  engineering  and  organizational  mining  techniques  to
discover roles if no role information is present in an event log. The role mining method used
in that work is adapted from [5], which is assigning subjects into roles based on the similarity
of performed tasks. At first, each subject has exactly one role. In the next step, subjects with
similar  permissions  (performing  similar  tasks)  are  grouped  together  into  single  role.
Eventually, these relations between different roles will result in a role hierarchy. In this work,
an assumption has been made that role information is present in an event log (using XES
organizational  extension).  The main  reason is  that  both  role  and subject  information  are
required in order to validate this approach (see chapter 6). Using this classification algorithm
may give different results for different event logs. However, in conformance checking the
classifications of users as roles needs to be the same for both event logs. In reality, if there is
no role information, then these user classifications needs to be examined and conformed by
domain worker before creating the RBAC model. This indicates that the process of creating
RBAC cannot be fully automated when there is no roles specified beforehand. Therefore, in
this work for simplicity, roles are identified using the “org:role” attribute in event logs. In
addition,  our approach is  only concerned with flat  RBAC models  without role hierarchy,
constraints, and separation of duty properties.
Another major difference is that, the only specified protected RBAC resource is information
system (referred to as  source from which the event log is extracted) in  [6], whereas in this
thesis, protected resources are resource attributes represented as data attributes in event logs.
These data attributes can be interpreted as different data fields of documents or artifacts used
during business process and they have a value to the organization. In  [6], business process
activities  are  identified  as  permissions,  because  they  are  performed  only  on  one  object
(information system).  Whereas  in  current  work,  there  can  be  a  number of  resources  and
permissions  are  resource-operation  pairs.  In  terms  of  Information  System Security  Risk
Management (ISSRM)[33], the protected resource in [6] is considered as information system
asset (material asset3) which supports business assets (immaterial assets, such as information,
3 Expect software
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processes). Therefore, the approach presented [6] tries to establish access control on the level
of information system, whereas current work on the level of information system resources.
The last notable difference is in the use of tool for access control policy management system,
called xoRBAC[31], in the approach  [1]. This tool can be integrated with software, which
requires integration via C or tcl linkage. In order to fill this gap in current work, a prototype
(see section 5.4) is developed, which demonstrates the applicability of current approach and
allows to make preliminary adjustments to the RBAC data. xoRBAC provides also features,
which support constrained RBAC. Constrained RBAC (section 3.3 in  [1]) defines notions
called static and dynamic separation of duties. An extension to [6], Baumgrass et al. present
an approach [15] for deriving static and dynamic separation of duties as well as subject and
role binding constraints from event logs. Constrained RBAC model and binding constraints
are out of the scope of this work. 
3.3 Comparsion of Related Works
In this section, we present a comparison between some of the related works  and current work
(see  Table 2). We have taken into account the following characteristics:  Business process
event logs – is the approach related with business process event logs;  RBAC – does this work
serves as basis for creating RBAC models; RBAC presented standard format – is the RBAC
model presented explicitly in some standard format; Protected business assets – is this work
concerned  with  protecting  business  assets,  such  as  document  data.  All  of  these  selected
approaches support extracting role information from system configuration files or logs, which
we have left out from the characteristics.
Three approaches are not using event log as the source to extract information. For example,
in  [26] the roles are found from large database of cross-platform access rights, in  [27] the
roles are mined from access log records (as permissions usages), in [28] roles with semantical
meanings are discovered from a synthesized data set. The solutions which are not focused on
creating RBAC models, do not give an explicit representations of RBAC either nor do they
are concerned with protecting business assets. The solutions presented in [6] and [29] include
creating RBAC models from the extracted data, which are exported in XML-based format
that is supported by xoRBAC[31]. One can argue, if the solution [29] is protecting business
assets or not. In [29], BPEL portTypes are interfaces to objects, therefore it can be said that
business assets are protected indirectly. As we discussed in previous section, then in [6] the
only  protected  resource  is  information  system,  which  makes  unclear  what  are  the  data
attributes and what operations are permitted on data resources.
The key focus of this approach is to protect business assets through access control, therefore
this approach complements the work [6] discussed in section  3.2. The main novelty of this
approach  lies  in  creating  RBAC  model  automatically  based  on  the  business  process
information extracted from an event log. Another contribution is storing the RBAC model in
XML-based  format  that  can  be  adapted  easily  by  different  applications.  For  example,
information systems that implement RBAC or access control policy management systems.
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Table 2: Comparison of related works
Business
process event
logs
RBAC RBAC
presented
standard
format
Protected
business
assets
Organization model mining [5] Yes No No No
Role  mining  using  data  mining
techniques [26]
No No No No
Machine learning to detect access
control policies [27]
No No No No
Role  mining  based  on  the
semantic meanings based on user
attributes [28]
No No No No
Deriving  current  state  RBAC
models from event logs [6]
Yes Yes Yes  (XML-
based  format
supported  by
xoRBAC)
No
(indirectly
through
information
system).
Creating  RBAC  model  from
BPEL  based  business  process
[29]
No Yes Yes  (XML-
based  format
supported  by
xoRBAC)
Yes
Current approach Yes Yes Yes Yes
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4 An Approach to Extract RBAC Models from Business
Process Event Logs
In this chapter, we present our contribution which includes the method to derive an RBAC
model from an event log which consists of three main steps, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the
first step, called analysis, a process mining technique is used to extract process-related data
from an event log in XES format. In the next step, extracted data can be transformed into an
in-memory RBAC model.  Before that, minor adjustments could be made to the extracted
data, so that the data and relationships would reflect actual settings of the business process. In
the final step, an RBAC model is exported to the XML-based format in order to support the
data exchange between different applications, e.g., information systems could implement the
RBAC model or access policy management systems could be used to enhance the RBAC
model. 
4.1 Analysing Event Log
Before an event log can be imported and analyzed, it needs to meet predefined requirements
(see section 2.2.3). In this work, we consider event logs represented in XES format (described
in ch.  2.2.2). The XES format supports the basic business process elements and has been
presented as a  standard logging format  by IEEE Task Force on Process Mining[18].  The
major benefit of using XES is that we can avoid tackling problems that may arise when using
different vendor-dependent business process logs. Analysis is important for getting insights
about the business process by extracting data and data relationships from the event log before
proceeding with creating an RBAC model.
The first step involves importing and analysing the event log. The analysis consists of parsing
the event log and extracting information about roles, originators, activities, data attributes of
the business process, and creating relationships between these elements (see  Figure 4). For
this purpose, an algorithm is used, described in section 4.2. 
When analysing the event log, no information about the secured resource is present in it, but
only a set of data attributes. Semantically, a composition of these data attributes describes the
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Figure 3: Step-wise approach of deriving RBAC model from an event log
Figure 4: Business process elements and relationships elicited form an
event log
resource. The resource attributes are interpreted as protected resources. We assume that they
have potentially a business-critical importance to the organization. Additionally, in this work,
activities  in  conjunction  with  event  type  (such as  start  or  completion  of  an activity)  are
considered activities.
4.2 Algorithm to Extract Business Process Elements and 
Relationships
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  high-level  algorithm (see  Algorithm 1)  for  discovering
business process elements and their  relationships.  First,  we need to have an event log as
input. Then we can begin with the procedure by instantiating variables, where:
1. R  is a finite set of roles present in the event log,
2. O  is a finite set of originators present in the event log,
3. A  is a finite set of activities present in the event log,
4. and D  is a finite set of data attributes (in here, we consider data attribute keys)
present in the event log. 
We define projections,  such as  πA(e)=a ,  πO (e )=o ,  πR(e)=r ,  πD(e)=d  on
every event. An event is defined as a 4-tuple e=(a ,o , r , d )∈E  , where a  is an activity,
o  is an originator,  r  is a role,  d  is a data attribute recorded with the event, and
E  is the universe of the events contained in the event log. For simplicity, we define only
one projection for data attribute (i.e., data attribute key)  d , however there can be more
different data attributes captured with the event.
We also define different assignments as follows:
a) Role-to-originator  assignments:
RO={(r , orig )∈R×O∣∃e∈E ,πR(e)=r∧πO (e )=orig } .  RO relation means that
if at least one event e∈E with originator orig∈O and role r∈R  is recorded
in the event log, then we assign role r  to originator orig .
b) Data-to-activity  assignments: DA={(d ,a )∈D×A∣∃e∈E ,πD(e )=d∧πA=a } .
DA  relation means that if at least one event e∈E  with data attribute d∈D
and activity a∈A  is recorded in the event log, then we assign data attribute d
to activity a , i.e., this data attribute d  can be accessed during activity a .
c) Activity-to-role  assignments: AR={(a , r )∈A x R∣∃e∈E ,πA(e )=a∧πR(e )=r } .
AR  relation means that if at least one event e∈E , where role r∈R  executes
activity  a∈A , is recorded in the event log, then we assign activity  a  to role
r , i.e., activity a can be executed by an originator with role r .
During the procedure we iterate over every event e∈E recorded in event log and check if
the event has any of the required elements attached. At every step we update the appropriate
value  sets  and relations.  Finally,  after  completing  the  procedure,  we have  an  in-memory
business process model, i.e., business process elements with data and relationships between
these elements.
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Algorithm 1: High-level algorithm to elicit business process elements and their relationships
Input: event log in XES format
Name: discovering business process elements and relationships
Output: in-memory business process model
set R←∅ ,O←∅ , A←∅ , D←∅
for each event e∈E do
     // get activity, originator, role, and data attribute from e
    a←πA(e) , orig←πO (e ) , r←πR(e) , d←πD (e)     
     // add elements to appropriate sets
     A←A∪{a} , R←R∪{r} , O←O∪{orig} , D←D∪{d }
     // add relations as assignments
     RO←RO∪{(r , orig)} , DA←DA∪{(d ,a )} , AR←AR∪{(a , r )}  
endfor
4.3 Creating RBAC Model
Before proceeding with the second step,  minor refinements can be made to the extracted
information. The adjustments might include changing role-subject, role-activity relationships,
and if necessary changing  role names and  data attributes (excluding the ones that are not
necessary). The rationale behind this refinement is to confirm assignments of users to roles,
actual activities performed by role, and select data attributes which are considered valuable
business assets to the organization. This is a manual activity that needs to be carried out by a
domain expert to assure that the information accurately reflects the actual real life process. 
In order to create an RBAC model from an in-memory business process as a set of business
process elements with values and relationships, we introduce transformation rules to translate
those business process elements and relationships (as in Figure 4) into RBAC model elements
and relationships (as in Figure 2). During this step, we take all the knowledge collected about
the business process and place it  in the context of security constraints  in the form of an
RBAC model. In general, most of the concepts are the same for business process models and
RBAC models. Thus, transformation rules take care of renaming business process elements to
RBAC model elements. The main value of transformation rules is to create permissions for
different roles based on the extracted business process information. As illustrated in Table 3,
we take business process elements (including element values)  role,  originator,  activity, and
data  attribute,  and  create  respective  RBAC model  elements  (with  values):  role,  subject,
operation,  and  resource  attribute.  In  the  RBAC  model,  we  do  not  create  relationships
between  role  and  activity  or  originator  and  activity.  Instead,  we  have  a  role-permission
assignment,  where permission is  an operation-resource attribute mapping (or activity-data
attribute, in the of business process terminology).
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Table 3: Tranformation rules for transforming business process elements and relations to 
RBAC model elements and relationships
Business process RBAC model Comment
Role Role Business process roles are translated to RBAC roles.
Originator Subject Originators (as users) are translated to RBAC subjects.
Activity Operation Business process activities are translated to RBAC operations.
Data (or data attribute) Resource (or resource attribute)
Data (or data attributes) are 
translated to RBAC resources (or
resource attributes).
Role-Activity - No direct role-operation in the RBAC model.
Originator-Activity - No direct subject-operation in the RBAC model.
Activity-Data attribute Operation-Resource attribute
Activities that access or 
manipulate data attributes are 
translated to operations on 
resource attributes. In the of 
RBAC terminology, this 
relationship is called as 
permission.
- Role-Permission
This relationship is created 
based on the Role-Activity and 
Activity-Data attribute 
relationships from the business 
process.
4.4 Algorithm to Transform Business Process Relationships to 
RBAC Model Relationships Using Transformation Rules
In this section, we describe the high-level algorithm (see Algorithm 2) to transform business
process  elements  and relationships  to  RBAC model  elements  and relationships  using the
transformation rules presented in Table 3.
First, we need to have as input an in-memory business process. In-memory business process
consists of a set of roles R , a set of originators O ,  a set of activities A , a set of data
attributes  D ,  and  assignments  RO ,  DA ,  and  AR (descriptions  and  informal
definitions are given in section 4.2).
We begin the procedure by instantiating the variables for the RBAC model:
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1. RRBAC  is a finite set of RBAC roles;
2. S RBAC  is a finite set of RBAC subjects;
3. ORBAC  is a finite set of RBAC operations;
4. RARBAC  is a finite set of RBAC resource attributes;
5. and PER  is a finite set of RBAC permissions.
We also define different assignments:
1. Role-to-subject  assignments: RS RBAC={(r , s)∈RRBAC×S RBAC ,(r , s)∈RO } .  RS RBAC
relation means that for every role-originator assignment  RO  in business process
model, there is role-to-subject assignment RS RBAC  in the RBAC model.
2. Resource-to-operation  assignments:
RAO RBAC={(res , o)∈RARBAC×ORBAC∣∃(res , o)∈DA} .  RAO RBAC  relation means that
for every data-to-activity assignment DA  in the business process model, there is a
resource-to-operation assignment RAO RBAC  in the RBAC model.
3. Permission  assignments:
PER={(res , o , r )∈RES RBAC×ORBAC×RRBAC ,(o , r )∈AR∧(res , o)∈DA} .  PER
relation means that for every such resource-activity assignment  (d ,a1)∈DA  and
activity-to-role assignment (a2, r )∈AR  where d∈D , a1, a2∈A and a1=a2 ,
r∈R  in business process model, there exists permission  (res , op , r )∈PER in
RBAC model, where res∈RARBAC  is protected resource attribute, op∈ORBAC  is
RBAC operation,  r∈RRBAC  is role, and res∈RARBAC  corresponds to  d∈D ,
op∈ORBAC  corresponds  to  a1  and  a2 ,  and  r∈R  corresponds  to
r∈RRBAC . 
Finally, after applying the transformation rules on the in-memory business process, we get the
in-memory RBAC model,  whose  components  and relationships  correspond to the  RBAC
model definition presented in section 2.3.
Algorithm 2: High-level algorithm to transform a business process model into a RBAC model
Input: in-memory business process model
Name: algorithm to transform business process model into RBAC model
Output: in-memory RBAC model
set RRBAC←∅ , S RBAC←∅ ,ORBAC←∅ , RARBAC←∅ , PRBAC←∅
for each activity a∈A
    opRBAC←a
    ORBAC←ORBAC∪{opRBAC }
endfor
for each originator o∈O
    subjectRBAC←o
    S RBAC← S RBAC∪{subjectRBAC }
endfor
for each role r∈R
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    r RBAC←r
    RRBAC←RRBAC∪{r RBAC }
endfor
// Role-subjects assignments
for each role-to-originator (r , o)∈RO
    roRBAC←(r , o)
   RS RBAC←RS RBAC∪{roRBAC }endfor
for each data attribute key d∈D
    d RBAC←d
    RES RBAC←RES RBAC∪{d RBAC }
endfor
// Resource-operation assignments
for each data-to-activity (d , a)∈DA
   da RBAC←(d ,a)
   RES O RBAC←RES ORBAC∪{daRBAC }endfor
// Permission assignments
for each resource resRBAC∈RA
    for each operation oRBAC∈ORBAC
        for each role r RBAC∈RRBAC
             if (resRBAC , oRBAC)∈DA∧(oRBAC , r RBAC )∈AR
             then
                 per←(resRBAC , oRBAC , r RBAC)
                 RA←RA∪{per}
             endif
        endfor
    endfor
endfor
4.5 Exporting RBAC Model
After the RBAC data is extracted from an event log, we can create an XML document which
presents the RBAC model. We decided to use the XML format, because it is supported in
many  environments,  and  is  a  base  for  integration  and  communication  between  different
applications. XML is platform-independent and is not only used for showing data values but
also constraints and relationships between data. Therefore, it is suitable for capturing RBAC
model elements and relationships. In this work, an XML document is used for making RBAC
models  available  to  other  applications,  for  example  when  implementing  an  RBAC
mechanism into the information system that supports business processes or when importing it
into an access control policy management system.
The structure of the XML document is provided in XML Schema Definition (XSD), which is
graphically represented in Figure 5 (the content of XSD file is given in Table 13). The XSD
for RBAC models defines the structure and necessary RBAC components (such as roles,
subjects, operations, resources or data resources), and the corresponding relationships (for
example role to subject assignments, operations on resources). There is a separate element in
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the XML document for permissions. XML document does not only contain permissions, but
also declares  RBAC component  instances  in  a  separate  list  with  unique  identifier.  These
instances are referred in other parts of the document with this unique identifier. The XSD also
defines  sub-elements  operations and  values for  resources,  i.e.,  permissible  operations  on
resource and possible values of resource.  Permissions element is divided into sub-elements
by resource, which in turn consists of sub-elements permission. Permission has attributes like
role and  operation  (representing the role-to-operation assignment). Permissions could have
also  been  presented  as  a  list  of  flat  elements,  all  having  attributes  resource,  role,  and
operation, but this is just a matter of representation.
4.6 Discussion
An event log can include information about user groups or departments (using “org:group”
key in XES), which should not be interpreted as roles. This kind of categorization is used for
dividing  users  into  departments  or  larger  user  groups  based on the  organizational  goals.
Therefore, this information can be used to develop an enterprise-wide RBAC model as an
extension of the standard RBAC model. In this work, we consider only simple RBAC models
without the mentioned extension.
In the core RBAC definition (section  2.3), the user has a permission for an operation that
changes a single resource. However, when we are dealing with business process event logs,
then  during  a  business  process  activity,  multiple  data  attributes  as  data  resources  are
manipulated.  We have  agreed  that  a  composition  of  data  attributes  within  an  event  is  a
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Figure 5: XML Schema Definition for RBAC model
resource  and  modifying  one  or  many data  attributes  implies  that  whole  resource  is  also
modified, although no information about whole resource is explicitly captured in event log.
Another  difference  with  the  standard  RBAC  definition  is  missing  information  about
operations with action types, such as create, read, update, delete. Action type information is
impossible to be automatically extracted from a log. Determining action types of different
operations would require insights about the business process. For the sake of simplicity, we
have  not  considered  action  types  in  our  RBAC  model,  but  they  can  be  seen  as  an
improvement of the current approach.
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5 Proof of Concept
In  this  chapter,  we illustrate  the  step-wise  approach on a  running example,  which  is  an
adjusted scenario from [8]. The scenario describes a process for handling a request for ticket
compensation within an airline (the process model is depicted in Figure 6). In section 5.1, we
present the results of analysing the example event log. In section 5.2, we present the results of
creating RBAC model from the business process information extracted in the analysis step. In
section 5.3, we present the output of exporting the created RBAC model in XML format. In
section 5.4, we explain the usage of the developed prototype for this thesis. The purpose of
this prototype is to demonstrate the applicability of the approach to create RBAC models
from event logs (semi-)automatically.
5.1 Analysing Event Log
Prerequisite for the first step is that we have an event log of the business process, which is
possibly generated by a non-RBAC information system. The event log needs to be in XES
format and meets the predefined requirements introduced in section 2.2.3. Once we have the
event log, we import the event log into the prototype application for analysis. The analysis
includes extracting business process related data and relationships from an event log using a
process  mining  technique  (the  algorithm  is  given  in  Algorithm  1).  As  a  result,  we  get
different elements and relationships of the business process (in [17], they are referred to as
business process entities and relationships) needed for constructing RBAC model.
First, we find role-to-originator assignments, i.e., roles, originators, and relationships between
them (as shown in Table 4). In our example, every user has exactly one role, however a user
can have more than one role (based on the RBAC definition given in section 2.3). We can see
from the table there are 3 different roles:  Assistant,  Manager, and  Expert; and there are in
total 5 different users: Pete, Ellen, Sara, Mike, Sean, where each subject is assigned to a role.
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Figure 6: Business process that corresponds to the example scenario
Table 4: Role-to-originator assignments discovered from the event log represented in Table 
12 
Originator Role
Pete Assistant
Ellen Assistant
Sara Manager
Mike Assistant
Sean Expert
Next we find data and data attributes being processed during the business activities. A list of
data attributes and activities extracted from the example event log is given in Table 5. There
are 3 data attributes (cost, cid (client id), and status) and there are in total 8 activities (i.e.,
Register  request,  Check ticket,  Examine thoroughly,  Examine casually,  Decide,  Reinitiate
request, Reject request, and Pay compensation). 
In business process, one activity can manipulate multiple data resource attributes at once (as
we can see also from the table),  which is  different  from the standard RBAC, where one
operation (an activity) can change only one data resource. However, as discussed in section
4.6, we consider compositions of data attributes resulting in a single resource. Therefore,
when we speak in terms of RBAC, then it is acceptable to change multiple data resource
attributes of a single data resource (a document or an artifact which is comprised of different
data fields) during one single operation. 
Table 5: Activities on different data attributes discovered from the example event log
Data attribute(s) Activity
cost, cid, status Register request
cost, cid, status Check ticket
cost, cid, status Examine thoroughly
cost, cid, status Examine casually
cost, cid, status Decide
cost, cid, status Reinitiate request
cost, cid, status Reject request
cost, cid, status Pay compensation
Lastly, we find roles executing particular activities (see Table 6). Each activity is performed
by only one role,  although a role  can be assigned to many users  and an activity can be
performed by many users. From the business point of view, one can also make conclusions
about what are the business tasks that different roles are responsible for.
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Table 6: Role and activity assignments discovered from the example event log 
Activity Role
Register request Assistant
Check ticket Assistant
Examine thoroughly Expert
Examine casually Assistant
Decide Manager
Reinitiate request Manager
Reject request Manager
Pay compensation Assistant
5.2 Creating RBAC Model
Prerequisite for creating an RBAC model is to have different perspectives of business process
as an in-memory business process model (discovered in the first step). Once we have an in-
memory business process, we can transform it into an in-memory RBAC model using the
transformation rules implemented in the prototype. The transformation rules (also presented
in Table 3) and the outcomes are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Results of transforming an in-memory business process model into an in-memory 
RBAC model using transformation rules
Transformation rule Business process model RBAC model
Role -> Role Assistant
Manager
Expert
Assistant
Manager
Expert
Originator -> Subject Pete
Ellen
Sara
Mike
Sean
Pete
Ellen
Sara
Mike
Sean
Role-Originator ->  Role-
Subject
Presented in  Table 4, only in
the business process context.
Presented in  Table 4, only in
the RBAC model context.
Data (or  data  attribute)  ->
Resource (or  resource
attribute)
cost
cid
status
cost
cid
status
Role-Activity ->  Role-
Operation
The  same  element  contents
and relationships as presented
in  Table  6,  only  in  the
business process context.
-
Activity-Data  attribute ->
Operation-Resource  attribute
(permission)
The  same  element  contents
and relationships as presented
in  Table  5,  only  in  the
The  same  element  contents
and relationships as presented
in Table 5, only in the RBAC
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Transformation rule Business process model RBAC model
Role -> Role Assistant
Manager
Expert
Assistant
Manager
Expert
business process context. model context.
Role-Permission - Role-Permission  assignments
are presented in Table 14.
After applying the transformation, we get the following RBAC components and contents:
• subjects: Pete, Ellen, Sara, Mike, Sean (the same individuals already identified within
the business process);
• roles:  Assistant,  Manager,  and  Expert (the  same  roles  already  identified  within
business the process);
• role-to-subject relationships: Assistant -  Pete,  Ellen,  Mike;  Manager -  Sara;  Expert -
Sean (the same relationships already identified in Table 4); 
• protected resource attributes: cost, data, status;
• permissions (a flat representation is given in Table 14).
We  visualize  the  in-memory  RBAC  model  using  SecureUML[22] (see  Figure  7).  The
diagram shows that TicketCompensationRequest is a protected resource as a composition of
the discovered resource attributes cost, cid, and status. In reality, information about resource
(specifically the name of the resource) may not be present in event log. Therefore, in order to
get protected resource and resource attributes as valuable assets for the business, they need to
be recorded in the event log, so that they can be used as a basis when creating the RBAC
model.
In  the  SecureUML  diagram  (see  Figure  7),  role-to-user  assignments  are  presented  as
associations  with  stereotype  <<secuml.roleAssignment>>.  A  permission,  such  as
ManagerTicktetCompensationRequestPermission,  is  presented  as  an  association  class  with
stereotype  <<secuml.permission>> between  role  Manager (a  role  class  annotated  with
stereotype  <<secuml.role>>)  and  resource  TicketCompensationRequest (a  resource  class
annotated with stereotype <<secuml.resource>>). Based on the running example,  Manager
has  permissions  to  perform  operations  decide,  reinitiateRequest,  and  rejectRequest on
resource TicketCompensationRequest. 
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5.3 Exporting RBAC Model
Prerequisite for exporting RBAC model in XML format is to have created an in-memory
object of RBAC model using our prototype application. Once we have an in-memory RBAC
model, we can use the XML writer implemented in our prototype to generate our RBAC
model  (in  the  form of  declarative  access  control  policies)  as  an  XML document,  whose
structure and data types are defined using XML Schema (represented in Table 13).
A fragment of the XML document generated for our running example is given in Figure 8. As
we can see, the XML document contains a complete list of RBAC data, such as subjects,
roles, resources, and permissions, and including all of the data relationships, such as the role-
to-subject,  resource-operation  assignments,  and  permissions.  Most  importantly,  we  can
capture  the  RBAC model  components  and  relationships  in  the  XML document  (the  full
contents of the XML document for our running example is given in  Table 15) as they are
represented in our in-memory RBAC model (as illustrated in  Figure 7 using SecureUML).
The RBAC model in XML format can be used by different applications for implementing
access  control  mechanisms  for  information  systems  that  support  the  underlying  business
process.
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Figure 7: TicketCompensationRequest resource permissions presented using SecureUML
5.4 Using The Prototype
In this section, we describe the overall process of using the developed prototype for creating
RBAC models from event logs. Event log can be opened using  Open event log in the  File
menu. The only supported event log file type is XES. Once we have the event log imported,
we  can  run  the  analysis  by  clicking  on  the  Analyze  button.  Event  log  file  is  internally
processed  and  an  algorithm  is  applied  to  discover  business  process  elements  and
relationships. 
After analysis, different views of discovered business process information are displayed in
three tabs: Roles, Attributes, and Operations (see Figure 9). These three different views show
role-to-originator (or role-to-subject) relationships, attribute-activity (or resource-operation)
relationships, and role-activity (or role-operation) relationships derived from the extracted
business process information. 
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Figure 8: A fragment of the XML document representing the RBAC model
Minor  adjustments  can  be  introduced  to  discovered  data.  For  instance,  we  can  rename
discovered roles in  Roles tab, change assignments of role-to-subject in  Roles tab and role-
operation in Operations tab. We can choose data attributes in Attributes tab which we think
are considered as protected resources.  New roles can be added to RBAC model using  Add
role button in Roles tab. New role can be assigned to admissible operations in the Operations
tab. Unfortunately, this prototype does not allow to add any other new relationships between
discovered business process elements.
Once the analysis is completed, RBAC model can be created by clicking on the Create RBAC
model button.  Internally,  in-memory  object  of  RBAC  model  is  created  after  the
transformation rules are applied on the business process data and relationships. Next we can
export the RBAC model in XML format via Export (also in the File menu there is an Export
button) and save it on the local hard drive. The XML file includes necessary RBAC model
elements, such roles, subjects, data, resources, and permissions, and relationships between
these elements.
Additionally, already existing RBAC model in XML format can be imported by clicking on
the  Import in the  File menu. Optionally, this imported data can be modified, as discussed
before,  and  new RBAC model  can  be  created  with  the  new adjustments.  Otherwise,  by
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Figure 9: An analyzed event log which different views are presented in three tabs: Roles, 
Attributes, and Operations
clicking on the Create RBAC model, new in-memory object is created based on the imported
data. The idea is to allow to modify and use already existing RBAC model instead of creating
RBAC from an event log again.
5.4.1 Comparison of RBAC Models With The Prototype
We can validate the created in-memory RBAC model against different RBAC model For the
validation, the other RBAC modal needs to be in XML format (follows the XML Schema
definition for our RBAC model as presented in Table 13) and can be imported by clicking on
the Validate button. If there are no differences, the application will notify the user. Otherwise,
a separate window opens where user can handle the discrepancies between different RBAC
models (see Figure 10). The user can resolve the differences (potential violations), which is
accepting or rejecting the differences, by clicking on the  Resolve and export button. In the
background, these two RBAC models are merged together into new resolved RBAC model
with changes accepted by the user.
 
5.4.2 Exporting LTL Constraints
For the validation of current approach, additional functionality was implemented into the
prototype  to  create  Linear  Temporal  Logic  formulas  from  RBAC  model  constraints
(specifically role-permission assignments). When in-memory RBAC model is created, we can
export LTL formulas based on the RBAC constraints by clicking on the Export LTL formulas
in the File menu (see Figure 11). In the background, an algorithm is applied on the RBAC
model constraints to get LTL formulas, which then are exported as LTL file. The generated
LTL can be used for checking conformance between RBAC model constraints and an event
log, as will be discussed in section 6.2.
35
Figure 10: Violation handling between different RBAC models
5.5 Discussion
In here we give  some reasoning regarding running example and RBAC model  concepts.
Business process activities can compose of more complex tasks than just manipulating data
attributes. In addition, the activity names can be also too ambiguous and do not indicate what
data  attributes  are  actually  accessed  or  changed,  for  example  „decide“,  „examine
thoroughly“, „examine casually“. For this reason, we only concentrate on the data attributes
being captured in an event log and the activities, despite their names, associated with these
attributes.
In most cases, event logs do not include information about action types (such as create, read,
update, delete) information, therefore it is impossible to automatically detect action types for
RBAC operations without such information, For this reason, we have not added any action
type  information  to  our  RBAC  models  and  have  not  presented  this  information  in
SecureUML diagram (see Figure 7). This is different to the standard SecureUML metamodel
[22] where every permission includes possible types of actions on every resource attribute. In
addition, for the sake of simplicity, we have not explicitly presenting any resource attribute
specific  methods in  the  SecureUML diagram or  in  our  RBAC models,  because  they are
mostly getting and setting data attribute values.
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Figure 11: Exporting RBAC model contraints as LTL contraints
6 Evaluation of The Approach Through Conformance 
Checking
In  this  chapter,  we evaluate  the  approach  (presented  in  chapter  4)  through  conformance
checking. The conformance checking is divided into two parts.  In the first part (see 6.1), we
show how we compare two RBAC models extracted from different event logs produced by
the same source information system and how we resolve the differences between these RBAC
models. In the second part (see 6.2), we show how we check the conformance of the event
log and the LTL formulas, which are translated from RBAC models. Lastly, we provide a
running example how the conformance checking is done on two real-life event logs.
6.1 Comparison of RBAC Models from Different Event Logs
A real-life  scenario would be that  the RBAC model  is  implemented into the information
system. However, we might still want to check if RBAC policies are enforced correctly and if
there are any deviations as possible vulnerabilities that might pose a threat to the security of
the  information  system and  its  data.  If  the  system is  process-aware  and  stores  business
process executions as a stream of events in format of XES, then we can use this event log to
extract RBAC data, as described in section  4.1. After that, we can confirm if there are any
deviations with the previous RBAC model and newly extracted RBAC model.
The first part of the conformance checking is illustrated in  Figure 12. Prerequisite for this
comparison  is  that  we  have  two  different  event  logs  which  are  produced  by  the  same
information system. These event  logs are  the input  for creating RBAC models  using the
approach presented in chapter 4. The first RBAC model extracted from the first event log is
considered as the base RBAC model, denoted as RBAC model A. The second RBAC model
extracted from the second event log (assumingly the newest event log) is considered as the
recent RBAC model, denoted as RBAC model B, which is validated against RBAC model A.
For the validation of these two RBAC models, we compare RBAC model constraints, i.e.,
permissions assigned to some particular role. If there are discrepancies in these constraints
then we interpret them as violations. In order to determine these violations, a two-way check
is performed: the RBAC model  B is tested against the RBAC model  A and vice versa. The
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Figure 12: Extracting RBAC model A and RBAC model B from different logs and adjusting 
RBAC model A to RBAC model B
check needs to  be done in both directions  in  order to  get  permissions  introduced by the
second RBAC model  B and permissions that are in the first RBAC model  A but not in the
second RBAC model B. For this reason, there can be different causes for these violations:
• the base RBAC model A can be outdated containing permissions that are not in effect
anymore;
• business process and responsibilities within an organization has changed, therefore
new permissions are introduced into the RBAC model B;
• the extracted RBAC model  B contains permissions that are not defined in the base
RBAC  model  A nor  these  permissions  are  introduced  by  organization  (possible
violations).
As a conclusion, not every case of violation is intentional. Violation handling needs to be
performed by knowledge worker who then distinguishes whether a violation is intentional or
not. After the knowledge worker has resolved all of the discrepancies, the adjusted RBAC
model can be generated which takes into account new changes. 
6.2 Conformance Checking with LTL Formulas
The second part of the conformance checking is illustrated in Figure 13. The rationale behind
this conformance checking is that the RBAC model constraints might not always be fully
compliant  with  the  business  process  executions  as  they  are  captured  in  an  event  log.
Therefore, we want to show that if we improve the RBAC model by introducing new RBAC
permissions, which is extracted from the event log, then the results could be better, too.
For this purpose, we use RBAC model A as the RBAC model, which is not fully compliant
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Figure 13: Creating LTL formulas based on the RBAC model A and the adjusted RBAC 
model. These LTL formulas are used to check the event log conformance against the RBAC 
models.
with the event log B. In order to improve the RBAC model A, we use the method described in
the previous section  6.1.  We extract the RBAC model  B from the event log  B. After the
comparison of the RBAC model  A and RBAC model  B, we adjust the RBAC model  A to
RBAC  model  B,  which  is  essentially  creating  new  RBAC  model  with  the  accepted
differences. As a result, we get the adjusted RBAC model, which can be interpreted as the
improved RBAC model.
For  checking  of  the  RBAC  model  A and  the  adjusted  RBAC  model  constraints  (role-
permission assignments) and the business process executions in the event log  B, we utilize
the approach presented  in  [7] where  LTL formulas  are  generated  from business  process-
related RBAC models. 
We create an LTL formula for every role-permission assignment,  the formula template is
presented in Table 8. The formula specifies if always some event with data attribute named
ATTR and operation ACTIVITY (optionally with EVENT_TYPE) occurs, then it is executed by
the  authorized  subject  P out  of  n authorized  subjects.  These  set  of  subjects  belong  to
respectful roles which have the permission. An excerpt of LTL file with example formula is
given in Table 9. We use subjects instead of roles in LTL formulas, because for LTL checker
plug-in  there  is  no  standard  definition  for  role  and  only  subject  declarations  (i.e.,
“ate.originator”) are supported. Another reason could be that in most event logs there are no
role information included.
Table 8: LTL formula to check role-permission assignment
[](((ATTR != "" /\ activity ==  ACTIVITY /\ eventType ==  EVENT_TYPE) ->
(subject == P1 \/ (subject == P_N-1 \/ subject == P_N ...))));
Table 9: LTL formula to check role-permission assignment for activity „Examine casually“
formula RO_Assistant_attr1_examine_casually () := {}
[](((attr1  !=  ""  /\  activity  ==  "examine  casually")  ->  (subject  ==
"Mike" \/ (subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete"))));
If this statement does not hold for some event in the sequence of events, then we can say that
the event in the sequence of the events is not consistent with this formula and could be a
possible violation with respect to RBAC model. 
As  illustrated  in  Figure  13,  we  use  LTL checker  plug-in  to  perform  the  conformance
checking. LTL checker plug-in expects an event log (possibly in format of XES) and LTL file
with the LTL formulas as the input in order to start analysing event log and checking the log
against  LTL formulas.  First,  we check  the  conformance  of  the  RBAC model  A  and  the
business  process  executions  in  the  event  log  B.  Next,  we check the  conformance of  the
adjusted RBAC model and the business process executions in the event log  B. Ideally, the
results for the adjusted RBAC model should be improved, i.e., the adjusted RBAC model is
more compliant with the event log B with respect to the RBAC model A.
6.3 A Running Example of Conformance Checking with LTL Rules
In this  section,  we illustrate  the  conformance checking with LTL formulas  on a  running
example. For this purpose, we use two different real-life event logs which originate from the
incident and problem management system of Volvo IT Belgium, called VINST[34], and were
prepared for the BPI Challenge 2013 [35]. The first event log is about open problems, and the
second event log is about closed problems. These event logs meet the requirements presented
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in section 2.2.3.
We create the base RBAC model A from the event log A, closed cases, and the RBAC model
B from the  event  log  B,  open cases.  We want  to  know how much  the  RBAC model  A
conforms to the business process executions in the event log B and check if how much the
conformance improves when adjusting the RBAC model A to RBAC model B.
We have implemented RBAC model validation into the developed prototype.  We use the
prototype to validate RBAC model B against the RBAC model A. An extract of the validation
results are given in Table 10 (for full list see Table 16), which consists of different examples
of violations. Violations are categorized as follows:
• Not allowed – no such authorization constraint is defined in the base RBAC model A,
although  role,  operation,  and  resource  definitions  are  the  same.  For  example,  an
individual with role C_5 is not allowed to perform operation Completed\nClosed on
product, because this is not permitted according to the RBAC model A, although such
combination is present in the RBAC model B. Remark: Activities and event types of
activities are separated with “\n”.
• New role,  new resource,  new operation – the RBAC model  B introduces new role,
resource,  or  operation  definitions.  For  example,  resource  (or  resource  attribute)
organization involved is not present in base RBAC model descriptions.
• Outdated – authorization constraint defined in base RBAC model is not used anymore
in other BRAC model.
Once we have validated the RBAC model B against the RBAC model A, we can create the
adjusted RBAC model.
Table 10: An extract of validation results of two RBAC models for open and closed cases
Role
Permission
Reason
Operation Resource
C_5 Completed\nClosed product Not allowed
C_7 Completed\nClosed product New role
E_9 Accepted\nIn
Progress
product New role
C_5 Completed\nClosed resource country Not allowed
C_5 Completed\nClosed organization country Not allowed
C_7 Accepted\nAssigned organization country New role
E_9 Accepted\nWait organization country New role
E_1 Completed\nClosed organization involved New resource
C_7 Completed\nClosed organization involved New  resource,  new
role
C_5 Accepted\nWait impact Outdated
Next, we create LTL formulas based on the RBAC model  A and the adjusted RBAC model
constraints,  specifically  role-permissions  assignments.  For  this  purpose,  a  high-level
algorithm (see  Algorithm 3) is implemented into the developed prototype to generate LTL
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formulas.  The algorithm takes input:  RBAC data attribute as protected resource attribute,
RBAC operation (or activity in business process), and a list of RBAC subjects. These three
attributes represent the role-permission relationship, where the role is a set of users and the
permission is the pair of attribute and operation. The output of the algorithm is the assembled
formula. These formulas are gathered into LTL file (with  ltl file extension), which can be
used  by  the  LTL checker  plug-in[36] of  the  process  mining  workbench  ProM[13].  The
contents of an example LTL file is given in Table 17). 
Once we have created the LTL formulas for the RBAC model A and for the adjusted RBAC
model, we make the use of the LTL checker plug-in which expects two inputs: an LTL file
which  constraints  LTL formulas  and  an  event  log  which  is  checked  against  these  LTL
formulas. We perform two conformance checks with LTL plug-in, first with the RBAC model
A and the event log B, and then with the adjusted RBAC model and the event log B. 
Algorithm 3: High-level algorithm to compose LTL formula for role-permission assignment
function createRolePermissionFormula(attribute, operation, subjects)
formula = ''
formulaA = ''
eventType = extractEventTypeFromOperation(operation)
if eventType != '' then
formulaA = '(attribute != "" /\ activity == "operation"  /\ 
eventType == "eventType")'
else
    formulaA = '(attribute != "" /\ activity == "operation")'
endif
prevFormulaS = ''
formulaS = ''
for every subject in subjects
formulaS = 'subject == "subject"';
if prevFormulaS != '' then
formulaS = '(formulaS \/ prevFormulaS)'
endif
prevFormulaS = formulaS
endfor
formula = '[]((formulaA -> formulaS))';
return formula
endfunction
The results of the first check are presented in Figure 14. The metrics used here to measure the
conformance is satisfied and unsatisfied LTL formulas. LTL checker gives us that there are 16
formulas out of 35 unsatisfied. For example, a subject named Habib is executing operation
Accepted (with  event  type  Assigned)  on  attribute  product (alias  attr1),  which  has  no
permission definition in the RBAC model A, therefore it is considered as a violation. This can
be also unintentional violation due to various reasons as explained in section 6.1.
The results  of the second check are presented in  Figure 15.  LTL checker  shows that  the
second  event  log  is  fully  compliant  with  the  adjusted  RBAC  model,  i.e.,  there  are  no
unsatisfied LTL formulas. Also fom the results, we can see that the subject named Habib has
now the permission to execute operation  Accepted (with event type  Assigned) on attribute
product.
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Figure 14: LTL checker results of conformance checking
Figure 15: Full conformance of RBAC model and an event log
6.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we have shown that extracting RBAC models from two real-life event logs is
applicable. In particular, we evaluated the approach with conformance checking, i.e.,  how
much  the  role-permission  assignments  defined  in  RBAC model  conform to  the  business
process executions as captured in an event log. Additionally, we used the LTL checker to
measure  the  conformance  of  RBAC  model  and  an  event  log  in  terms  of  satisfied  and
unsatisfied LTL formulas. 
In section  6.1, the different event logs may not capture the entire business process, which
inevitably will lead to deviations between RBAC models. This means that these differences
needs to be resolved manually by domain worker. Additionally, we used different logs instead
of doing the conformance checks with one event log. For obvious reasons, the RBAC model
will  be  fully  compliant  with  the  event  log  from which  the  RBAC model  was  extracted.
Therefore, the goal was also to show that we can improve the extracted RBAC models. The
improvement was measured in terms of satisfied and unsatisfied LTL constraints. 
In  section  6.2,  we  define  formula  (see  Table  8)  which  checks  only  for  role-permission
assignments, i.e., the LTL formula is satisfied if the permission exists in RBAC model and it
is performed by authorized subject defined in RBAC model or the permission does not exist
in RBAC model, then the formula does not check any further and the formula is satisfied
automatically. For the latter case, a (sub)formula is needed to check if operation and resource
attribute relationship is also in accordance with the RBAC model.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
In  this  thesis,  we  have  proposed  an  approach  how  to  extract  RBAC  models
(semi-)automatically from event logs in XES format, where the focus is also on determining
the protected business assets, such as document or other artifact data that is exchanged and
accessed during business process activities. We divided the approach into three consecutive
steps.  The first  step  involves  in  analysing  event  log,  which  is  utilizing  business  process
mining technique to extract business process elements and relationships from an event log.
The results of the first step are the input for creating in-memory RBAC model in the second
step.  We create RBAC model  by applying transformation rules on the extracted business
process elements and relationships. In the last step, we export in-memory RBAC model to
XML document, whose structure is specifically defined by XML Schema Definition for this
work. In addition, we evaluated the approach through conformance checking. 
7.1 Limitations
In this work, we have required that both user and role information is present in event log,
although  user  information  is  not  entirely  needed  when  creating  RBAC  model.  This
requirement is only set for conformance checking using Linear Temporal Logic constraints. 
The developed prototype allows to make primitive changes to the extracted business process
data and relationships, such as changing role-user relationships, role-activity relationships,
and  including  or  excluding  data  attributes  as  protected  resources.  It  does  not  allow  to
introduce new users, new activities and thereby new RBAC permissions.
We are  not  including  RBAC operation  types  in  our  RBAC model,  such  as  create,  read,
update, delete. Mainly because they are difficult or even impossible to extract from event logs
automatically without knowing the underlying business process or PAIS implementation.
7.2 Conclusions
We have built our thesis around two research questions (formulated in chapter 1):
1. What data could be extracted from a  business process event log  and how this data
could be used for creating RBAC models?
When answering to the first question we addressed what is the data that could be extracted
from an event log and how this data could be used for creating standard RBAC models. We
selected the XES as the primary format of event logs in this thesis work, which can include
the  minimum set  of  business  process  elements,  such  as  users,  roles,  activities,  and  data
attributes, to derive RBAC model components. In order to extract the data from potentially
large event logs, we used the process mining technique (an algorithm presented in Algorithm
1). We divided the approach of creating RBAC model from an event log into 3 steps. The first
step is analyzing event log (as discussed in section 4.1), which is extracting business process
data from an input event log. The outcome of the first step is the business process elements
and relationships. The second step involves in creating RBAC model (as discussed in section
4.3) based on the extracted business process elements and relationships using transformation
rules (presented in Table 3). We get in-memory object of RBAC model as the output. Lastly,
we can present this RBAC model explicitly by exporting the in-memory object of RBAC
model  as  XML document (as discussed in  section  4.5).  The XML document follows the
structure  and  data  type  constraints  of  XML Schema Definition  proposed for  our  RBAC
models.
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2. How applicable is this approach on real-life business process event logs?
When answering to the second question we addressed the possible methods how to validate
the approach. In this work, we evaluated the approach through conformance checking. For
that reason, we used a real-life event log from BPI Challenge 2013, which was split into two
parts, open and closed cases. The first conformance checking included the comparison of
RBAC models created from different log samples of an event log. The second conformance
checking was testing the compliance of RBAC model constraints in the form of the Linear
Temporal Logic formula against an event log.
As a result, we have shown a possible approach how to create RBAC models from event logs
generated by information systems that support business processes. The aim was not to only
get RBAC roles, but to also focus on extracting information about business assets that needs
to be protected. The contribution of this work also includes developed prototype application
(as  discussed  in  chapter  5)  to  demonstrate  the  applicability of  our  approach and to  also
provide  means of  the  approach evaluation,  such as  validating  and merging two different
RBAC models and creating LTL constraints based on RBAC model constraints. 
7.3 Future Work
Although, we have required that role information needs to be included in the event logs for
this approach, but typically there are no role information in event logs. The next opportunity
would be to extend this work with discovering roles based on the characteristics of event log
in XES format  (or in MXML[37],  an alternative but  not  so preferred logging format  for
business processes). A possible solution would be to apply classification algorithms. Some
existing ideas were presented in the section of related work.
In this work, we use our XML Schema Definition for presenting RBAC models. Apparently,
there  are  more  sophisticated  technologies  how  to  specify  RBAC  model  in  XML-based
format. We see an opportunity to develop an extension to export RBAC models created from
event logs also in XACML[38] or in X-RBAC[39].
Additionally,  due  to  the  limited  capabilities  of  managing  extracted  RBAC data  with  the
developed prototype, improvements can be made to the current solution. Alternatively, this
tool can be integrated with existing access control policy management systems, for example
xoRBAC[31].
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Appendix A – Example event log as tabular data
Table 11: Example event log as tabular data
#PID #EID #DATETIME #Activity #Resource #Role #Cost #Customer
ID
#Status
1 25654521 30-12-2013 15:10 register request Pete Assistant 50 1123 1
1 25654523 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
casually
Mike Assistant 400 1123 1
1 25654524 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Ellen Assistant 100 1123 1
1 25654525 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1123 2
1 25654528 30-12-2013 15:10 reinitiate 
request
Sara Manager 200 1123 2
1 25654530 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
thoroughly
Sean Expert 400 1123 1
1 25654531 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Pete Assistant 100 1123 1
1 25654532 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1123 2
1 25654533 30-12-2013 15:10 pay 
compensation
Ellen Assistant 200 1123 3
2 25654534 30-12-2013 15:10 register request Pete Assistant 50 1717 1
2 25654535 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Mike Assistant 100 1717 1
2 25654536 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
thoroughly
Sean Expert 400 1717 1
2 25654537 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1717 2
2 25654538 30-12-2013 15:10 reject request Ellen Assistant 200 1717 4
3 25654539 30-12-2013 15:10 register request Ellen Assistant 50 1718 1
3 25654540 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
casually
Mike Assistant 400 1718 1
3 25654541 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Pete Assistant 100 1718 1
3 25654541 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1718 2
3 25654543 30-12-2013 15:10 reinitiate 
request
Sara Manager 200 1718 2
3 25654544 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Ellen Assistant 100 1718 1
3 25654545 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
casually
Mike Assistant 400 1718 1
3 25654546 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1718 2
3 25654547 30-12-2013 15:10 pay 
compensation
Ellen Assistant 200 1718 3
4 25654550 30-12-2013 15:10 register request Mike Assistant 50 1900 1
4 25654555 30-12-2013 15:10 check ticket Ellen Assistant 100 1900 1
4 25654556 30-12-2013 15:10 examine 
casually
Mike Assistant 400 1900 1
4 25654559 30-12-2013 15:10 decide Sara Manager 200 1900 2
4 25654560 30-12-2013 15:10 pay 
compensation
Ellen Assistant 200 1900 3
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Appendix B – Example event log in format of XES
Table 12: Example event log in format of XES
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!-- This file has been generated with the OpenXES library. It conforms -->
<!-- to the XML serialization of the XES standard for log storage and -->
<!-- management. -->
<!-- XES standard version: 1.0 -->
<!-- OpenXES library version: 1.0RC7 -->
<!-- OpenXES is available from http://www.openxes.org/ -->
<log xes.version="1.0" xes.features="nested-attributes" openxes.version="1.0RC7" 
xmlns="http://www.xes-standard.org/">
    <trace>
        <string key="concept:name" value="1"/>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Pete"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="decide"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Mike"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="400"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="examine casually"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sean"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Expert"/>
            <int key="cost" value="400"/>
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            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="examine thoroughly"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="3"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="pay compensation"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Pete"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="50"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="register request"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1123"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="reinitiate request"/>
        </event>
    </trace>
    <trace>
        <string key="concept:name" value="2"/>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Mike"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1717"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1717"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="decide"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sean"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Expert"/>
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            <int key="cost" value="400"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1717"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="examine thoroughly"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Pete"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="50"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1717"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="register request"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="4"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1717"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="reject request"/>
        </event>
    </trace>
    <trace>
        <string key="concept:name" value="3"/>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Pete"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="decide"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Mike"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
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            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="400"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="examine casually"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="3"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="pay compensation"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="50"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="register request"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1718"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="reinitiate request"/>
        </event>
    </trace>
    <trace>
        <string key="concept:name" value="4"/>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="100"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1900"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="check ticket"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Sara"/>
            <int key="status" value="2"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Manager"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1900"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="decide"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Mike"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
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            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="400"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1900"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="examine casually"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Ellen"/>
            <int key="status" value="3"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="200"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1900"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="pay compensation"/>
        </event>
        <event>
            <string key="org:resource" value="Mike"/>
            <int key="status" value="1"/>
            <date key="time:timestamp" value="2013-12-30T15:10:00+02:00"/>
            <string key="org:role" value="Assistant"/>
            <int key="cost" value="50"/>
            <int key="cid" value="1900"/>
            <string key="concept:name" value="register request"/>
        </event>
    </trace>
</log>     
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Appendix C – Event log structure
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Figure 16: Event logs structure (adapted from [8] p. 100)
Appendix D – XML Schema Definition for RBAC model
Table 13: XML Schema Definition for RBAC model
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!-- edited with XMLSpy v2014 rel. 2 (x64) (http://www.altova.com) by Taivo Teder
(University of Tartu) -->
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
elementFormDefault="qualified">
    <!-- RBAC element -->
    <xs:element name="rbac">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:sequence>
                <xs:element name="subjects" type="subjects_type"/>
                <xs:element name="operations" type="operations_type"/>
                <xs:element name="roles" type="roles_type"/>
                <xs:element name="resources" type="resources_type"/>
                <xs:element name="permissions" type="permissions_type"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
    <!-- Subjects complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="subjects_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="subject" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                <xs:complexType>
                    <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string"/>
                </xs:complexType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Operations complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="operations_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="operation" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                <xs:complexType>
                    <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string"/>
                </xs:complexType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Roles complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="roles_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="role" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                <xs:complexType>
                    <xs:sequence>
                        <xs:element name="subjects">
                            <xs:complexType>
                                <xs:sequence>
                                    <xs:element name="subject" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded">
                                        <xs:complexType>
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                                            <xs:attribute name="refid" 
type="xs:string"/>
                                        </xs:complexType>
                                    </xs:element>
                                </xs:sequence>
                            </xs:complexType>
                        </xs:element>
                    </xs:sequence>
                    <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string"/>
                </xs:complexType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Resources complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="resources_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="resource" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                <xs:complexType>
                    <xs:sequence>
                        <xs:element name="operations">
                            <xs:complexType>
                                <xs:sequence>
                                    <xs:element name="operation" 
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                                        <xs:complexType>
                                            <xs:attribute name="refid" 
type="xs:string"/>
                                        </xs:complexType>
                                    </xs:element>
                                </xs:sequence>
                            </xs:complexType>
                        </xs:element>
                        <xs:element name="values" type="values_type" />
                    </xs:sequence>
                    <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string"/>               
                </xs:complexType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Values complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="values_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="value" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Permissions complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="permissions_type">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="resource" type="resource_type" minOccurs="1" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <!-- Resource complex type -->
    <xs:complexType name="resource_type">
57
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="permission" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                <xs:complexType>
                    <xs:attribute name="operation" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="action" type="xs:string"/>
                    <xs:attribute name="role" type="xs:string"/>
                </xs:complexType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:attribute name="refid" type="xs:string"/>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>           
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Appendix E – Business process elements in event log in
format of XES
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Figure 17: Business process elements presented in the event log in format of XES
Appendix F – RBAC permissions derived from example 
event log
Table 14: RBAC permissions derived from example event log
Resource (or resource
attribute)
Operation Role
cost Register request Assistant
Check ticket Assistant
Examine thoroughly Expert
Examine casually Assistant
Decide Manager
Reinitiate request Manager
Reject request Manager
Pay compensation Assistant
cid Register request Assistant
Check ticket Assistant
Examine thoroughly Expert
Examine casually Assistant
Decide Manager
Reinitiate request Manager
Reject request Manager
Pay compensation Assistant
status Register request Assistant
Check ticket Assistant
Examine thoroughly Expert
Examine casually Assistant
Decide Manager
Reinitiate request Manager
Reject request Manager
Pay compensation Assistant
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Appendix G – An example RBAC model in format of XML
An example RBAC model in format of XML that follows the XSD presented in Table 13.
Table 15: An example RBAC model in format of XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<rbac xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="rbac.xsd">
    <subjects>
        <subject id="subject1" name="Pete"/>
        <subject id="subject2" name="Ellen"/>
        <subject id="subject3" name="Sara"/>
        <subject id="subject4" name="Mike"/>
        <subject id="subject5" name="Sean"/>
    </subjects>
    <operations>
        <operation id="operation1" name="decide"/>
        <operation id="operation2" name="pay compensation"/>
        <operation id="operation3" name="examine casually"/>
        <operation id="operation4" name="reinitiate request"/>
        <operation id="operation5" name="check ticket"/>
        <operation id="operation6" name="examine thoroughly"/>
        <operation id="operation7" name="register request"/>
        <operation id="operation8" name="reject request"/>
    </operations>
    <roles>
        <role id="role1" name="Expert">
            <subjects>
                <subject refid="subject5"/>
            </subjects>
        </role>
        <role id="role2" name="Manager">
            <subjects>
                <subject refid="subject3"/>
            </subjects>
        </role>
        <role id="role3" name="Assistant">
            <subjects>
                <subject refid="subject1"/>
                <subject refid="subject2"/>
                <subject refid="subject4"/>
            </subjects>
        </role>
    </roles>
    <resources>
        <resource id="resource1" name="status">
            <operations>
                <operation refid="operation1"/>
                <operation refid="operation2"/>
                <operation refid="operation3"/>
                <operation refid="operation4"/>
                <operation refid="operation5"/>
                <operation refid="operation6"/>
                <operation refid="operation7"/>
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                <operation refid="operation8"/>
            </operations>
            <values>
                <value>3</value>
                <value>2</value>
                <value>1</value>
                <value>4</value>
            </values>
        </resource>
        <resource id="resource2" name="cost">
            <operations>
                <operation refid="operation1"/>
                <operation refid="operation2"/>
                <operation refid="operation3"/>
                <operation refid="operation4"/>
                <operation refid="operation5"/>
                <operation refid="operation6"/>
                <operation refid="operation7"/>
                <operation refid="operation8"/>
            </operations>
            <values>
                <value>200</value>
                <value>400</value>
                <value>100</value>
                <value>50</value>
            </values>
        </resource>
        <resource id="resource3" name="cid">
            <operations>
                <operation refid="operation1"/>
                <operation refid="operation2"/>
                <operation refid="operation3"/>
                <operation refid="operation4"/>
                <operation refid="operation5"/>
                <operation refid="operation6"/>
                <operation refid="operation7"/>
                <operation refid="operation8"/>
            </operations>
            <values>
                <value>1717</value>
                <value>1718</value>
                <value>1900</value>
                <value>1123</value>
            </values>
        </resource>
    </resources>
    <permissions>
        <resource refid="resource1">
            <permission action="" operation="operation1" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation2" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation3" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation4" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation5" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation7" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation6" role="role1"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation8" role="role3"/>
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        </resource>
        <resource refid="resource2">
            <permission action="" operation="operation1" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation2" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation3" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation4" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation5" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation7" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation6" role="role1"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation8" role="role3"/>
        </resource>
        <resource refid="resource3">
            <permission action="" operation="operation1" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation2" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation3" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation4" role="role2"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation5" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation7" role="role3"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation6" role="role1"/>
            <permission action="" operation="operation8" role="role3"/>
        </resource>
    </permissions>
</rbac>
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Appendix H – Conformance checking results
Table 16: Validation results of two RBAC models for open and closed cases (first 50 rows)
Role Permission Reason
Operation Resource
C_5 Completed\nClosed product Not allowed
C_7 Completed\nClosed product New role
E_9 Completed\nClosed product New role
C_7 Accepted\nIn Progress product New role
E_9 Accepted\nIn Progress product New role
A2_4 Completed\nCancelled product Not allowed
A2_3 Completed\nCancelled product Not allowed
E_5 Completed\nCancelled product Not allowed
A2_2 Unmatched\nUnmatched product Not allowed
A2_3 Unmatched\nUnmatched product Not allowed
A2_1 Unmatched\nUnmatched product Not allowed
C_6 Unmatched\nUnmatched product Not allowed
E_3 Unmatched\nUnmatched product Not allowed
E_9 Accepted\nWait product New role
C_3 Accepted\nWait product Not allowed
E_2 Accepted\nWait product Not allowed
C_5 Accepted\nAssigned product Not allowed
C_7 Accepted\nAssigned product New role
E_9 Accepted\nAssigned product New role
C_3 Accepted\nAssigned product Not allowed
E_5 Accepted\nAssigned product Not allowed
C_7 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment product New role
D_1 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment product Not allowed
E_3 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment product Not allowed
V8_1 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment product New role
C_5 Completed\nClosed org:group Not allowed
C_7 Completed\nClosed org:group New role
E_9 Completed\nClosed org:group New role
C_7 Accepted\nIn Progress org:group New role
E_9 Accepted\nIn Progress org:group New role
64
A2_4 Completed\nCancelled org:group Not allowed
A2_3 Completed\nCancelled org:group Not allowed
E_5 Completed\nCancelled org:group Not allowed
A2_2 Unmatched\nUnmatched org:group Not allowed
A2_3 Unmatched\nUnmatched org:group Not allowed
A2_1 Unmatched\nUnmatched org:group Not allowed
C_6 Unmatched\nUnmatched org:group Not allowed
E_3 Unmatched\nUnmatched org:group Not allowed
E_9 Accepted\nWait org:group New role
C_3 Accepted\nWait org:group Not allowed
E_2 Accepted\nWait org:group Not allowed
C_5 Accepted\nAssigned org:group Not allowed
C_7 Accepted\nAssigned org:group New role
E_9 Accepted\nAssigned org:group New role
C_3 Accepted\nAssigned org:group Not allowed
E_5 Accepted\nAssigned org:group Not allowed
C_7 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment org:group New role
D_1 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment org:group Not allowed
E_3 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment org:group Not allowed
V8_1 Queued\nAwaiting Assignment org:group New role
C_5 Completed\nClosed resource country Not allowed
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Appendix I – Example LTL file
Table 17: Example LTL file with RBAC role-permission assignments as LTL formulas
string ate.status;
rename ate.status as attr1;
string ate.cid;
rename ate.cid as attr3;
string ate.cost;
rename ate.cost as attr2;
set ate.EventType;
set ate.Originator;
set ate.WorkflowModelElement;
rename ate.Originator as subject;
rename ate.WorkflowModelElement as activity;
rename ate.EventType as eventType;
formula RP_attr1_decide () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "decide") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr1_pay_compensation () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "pay compensation") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr1_examine_casually () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "examine casually") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr1_reinitiate_request () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "reinitiate request") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr1_check_ticket () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "check ticket") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr1_register_request () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "register request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr1_examine_thoroughly () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "examine thoroughly") -> subject == "Sean"));
formula RP_attr1_reject_request () := {}
[](((attr1 != "" /\ activity == "reject request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr2_decide () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "decide") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr2_pay_compensation () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "pay compensation") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr2_examine_casually () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "examine casually") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr2_reinitiate_request () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "reinitiate request") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr2_check_ticket () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "check ticket") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr2_register_request () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "register request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr2_examine_thoroughly () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "examine thoroughly") -> subject == "Sean"));
formula RP_attr2_reject_request () := {}
[](((attr2 != "" /\ activity == "reject request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
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( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr3_decide () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "decide") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr3_pay_compensation () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "pay compensation") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr3_examine_casually () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "examine casually") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr3_reinitiate_request () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "reinitiate request") -> subject == "Sara"));
formula RP_attr3_check_ticket () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "check ticket") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr3_register_request () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "register request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
formula RP_attr3_examine_thoroughly () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "examine thoroughly") -> subject == "Sean"));
formula RP_attr3_reject_request () := {}
[](((attr3 != "" /\ activity == "reject request") -> ( subject == "Mike" \/ 
( subject == "Violator" \/ ( subject == "Ellen" \/ subject == "Pete" )))));
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Appendix J – XES meta model
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Figure 18: XES meta model (adapted from [21])
Appendix K – Prototype
The  prototype  source  code  is  submitted  with  this  thesis  work  in  an  archive  file
RbacModelTool.zip. The prototype is written in Java language, therefore Java needs to be
installed in order to run the application. Also, the prototype source code is maintained in Git
repository and is accessible at address: https://bitbucket.org/tefkon/rbac-model-tool. The copy
of the Git repository can be cloned into the local Git project with the following command
(requires that Git is installed into the computer):
git clone https://tefkon@bitbucket.org/tefkon/rbac-model-tool.git
Building the project is done through Maven with the command mvn package which creates
the executable jar-file into the project's target/ folder.
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